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This article explores the interplay between language and intercultural communication
within refugee status determination procedures in the UK and France, using material
taken from ethnographic research that involved a combination of participant
observation, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis in both countries
over a two-year period (2007–2009). It is concerned, in particular, to examine the role
played by interpreters in facilitating intercultural communication between asylum
applicants and the different administrative and legal actors responsible for assessing or
defending their claims. The first section provides an overview of refugee status
determination procedures in the UK and France, introducing the main administrative
and legal contexts of the asylum process within which interpreters operate in the two
countries. The second section compares the organisation of interpreting services,
codes of conduct for interpreters and institutional expectations about the nature of
interpreters’ activity on the part of the relevant UK and French authorities. The third
section then explores some of the practical dilemmas for interpreters and barriers to
communication that exist in refugee status determination procedures in the two
countries. The article concludes by emphasising the complex and active nature of the
interpreter’s role in UK and French refugee status determination procedures.
Keywords: interpretation; translation; refugee status determination procedures;
interpreters; UK; France
Cet article examine l’interaction entre le langage et la communication interculturelle
dans les procédures de détermination du statut de réfugié au Royaume-Uni et en
France. Il s’appuie sur les résultats d’une recherche ethnographique (observation
participante, entretiens semi-directifs et analyse documentaire) menée entre 2007 et
2009 dans les deux pays. En particulier, il s’attache à examiner le rôle joué par les
interprètes en facilitant la communication interculturelle entre les demandeurs d’asile
et les différents acteurs administratifs et juridiques chargés de l’examen ou de la
défense de leurs demandes. L’article est divisé en trois parties: la première donne un
aperçu des procédures de détermination du statut de réfugié au Royaume-Uni et en
France; la deuxième compare l’organisation des services d’interprétariat, les codes de
déontologie pour interprètes, et les attentes institutionnelles concernant l’activité de
l’interprète dans les deux pays; et la troisième examine les dilemmes pratiques
auxquels les interprètes sont souvent confrontés et les obstacles à la communication
qui existent dans les procédures d’asile au Royaume-Uni et en France. L’article
conclut en insistant sur le rôle complexe et actif joué par l’interprète dans les
procédures de détermination du statut de réfugié dans les deux pays.
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Introduction
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
defines a ‘refugee’ as someone who has a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion’. The administrative and legal procedures adopted by signatories to the convention
for determining whether an individual satisfies this definition characteristically involve
complex processes of cultural and linguistic translation and interpretation. In the following
article, we explore the interplay between language and intercultural communication within
refugee status determination procedures in the UK and France, comparing the ways in
which linguistic and intercultural issues are addressed, in theory and in practice, in the two
countries. We will be concerned, in particular, to examine the role played by interpreters in
facilitating intercultural communication between, on the one hand, asylum applicants and,
on the other, the different administrative and legal actors (e.g. civil servants, rapporteurs,
lawyers and judges) responsible for assessing or defending their claims.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook recom-
mends that ‘[t]he applicant should be given the necessary facilities, including the services of
a competent interpreter, for submitting his [sic] case to the authorities concerned’ (UNHCR
1992) [para. 192 (iv)]. Similarly, para. 13 of the Introduction to the European Council
Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 (the ‘Procedures Directive’) states that:
the procedure in which an application for asylum is examined should normally provide an
applicant at least with (…) access to the services of an interpreter for submitting his/her case
if interviewed by the authorities, (…) and the right to be informed of his/her legal position at
decisive moments in the course of the procedure, in a language he/she can reasonably be
supposed to understand.
More specifically, Article 13.3(b) of the Procedures Directive asserts, with regard to the
personal interview conducted with an asylum applicant, that it is incumbent on Member
States to:
select an interpreter who is able to ensure appropriate communication between the applicant
and the person who conducts the interview. The communication need not necessarily take
place in the language preferred by the applicant for asylum if there is another language
which he/she may reasonably be supposed to understand and in which he/she is able to
communicate.1
Among the issues raised by the wording of the UNHCR recommendation, and by the
Procedures Directive in both its original and recast forms, are what constitutes ‘appropriate
communication’, how is the competence of an interpreter to be defined and assessed and
how is the applicant’s understanding of and ability to communicate in a language other
than their preferred one to be defined and established.2 This article investigates how such
questions have been approached within refugee status determination procedures in the UK
and France, using material taken from ethnographic research that involved a combination
of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis in both
countries over a two-year period (2007–2009).
The first section of the article provides an overview of refugee status determination
procedures in the UK and France, introducing the main administrative and legal contexts of
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the asylum process within which interpreters operate in the two countries. The second
section compares the organisation of interpreting services, codes of conduct for interpreters
and institutional expectations about the nature of interpreters’ activity (particularly with
regard to the extent to which this is defined as ‘translation’ or ‘interpretation’) on the part of
the relevant UK and French authorities. The third section then explores some of the
practical dilemmas for interpreters and barriers to communication that exist in refugee
status determination procedures in the two countries. The article concludes by emphasising
the interplay of language issues and intercultural communication and the complex nature of
the interpreter’s role in UK and French refugee status determination procedures.
Refugee status determination processes in the UK and France
In the UK, asylum claims are administered by a branch of the Home Office: the UK
Border Agency (UKBA). As soon as UKBA receives a claim, it conducts a screening
interview with the applicant in order to establish their identity and collect basic personal
information. A far more detailed interview with a UKBA case-owner takes place a few
weeks later. This second interview usually lasts for several hours and follows a rigid
question and answer format. The case-owner focuses here on establishing the basic
chronology of the applicant’s narrative and on testing its internal credibility. At both
interviews interpreters hired by UKBA are present.3
After the interview, the case-owner must decide whether the asylum claim should be
granted or refused. In the former case, the applicant is granted refugee status or another
form of international protection, and notified of this decision without any specific reasons
being given. More frequently, however, the claim is refused and the case-owner writes a
Reasons for Refusal Letter (RFRL) explaining and justifying this decision. Most RFRLs
claim that the applicant’s story lacks credibility as a result of alleged inconsistencies in
their answers or on the grounds that aspects of their narrative are inconsistent with the
cited Country of Origin Information (COI) or because their story is deemed inherently
unlikely.
An appeal to an Immigration Judge (IJ) in the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and
Asylum Chamber) is possible following most refusals of asylum by UKBA.4 A solicitor
assembles the documents for the appeal, including the appellant’s own witness statement
as taken down by the solicitor with the aid of their own interpreter, and any relevant COI,
but (in England though generally not in Scotland) the advocate who actually represents
the appellant in court is normally a barrister (counsel). UKBA is generally represented in
court by a Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO), who is a civil servant rather than a
professional lawyer.
An appeal hearing begins with the appellant’s ‘examination-in-chief’.5 Usually very
short, this involves an appellant being asked by their counsel simply to confirm that the
contents of their asylum interview transcript and witness statement are true (clarifying
any points that are claimed to be inaccurate) and that they wish to submit these
documents as evidence. The HOPO then cross-examines the appellant. Typically lasting
one or two hours, this is the longest part of the hearing. If the barrister wishes, they may
then re-examine their client, and very occasionally other witnesses may be called to
corroborate the appellant’s story or give expert evidence.
The final part of the hearing begins with closing submissions to the IJ by the HOPO,
who argues that the refusal of asylum should be upheld. The HOPO’s submissions
generally involve attacks on the credibility of the appellant’s narrative, but ‘objective
evidence’ in the form of COI about the situation in the appellant’s country of origin is also
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cited, with the claim that it supports the UKBA’s original decision. The appellant’s barrister
then attempts to rebut the credibility points and offers rival interpretations of the COI. After
the hearing, the IJ produces a written determination announcing the decision and indicating
how much weight has been given to each piece of evidence, including COI.6
In France, asylum applications are examined in the first instance by the French Office
for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons [Office français de protection des
réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA)].7 Established in 1952, the OFPRA is a public institution
endowed with legal personality as well as financial and administrative autonomy. It
currently works under the authority (tutelle) of the French Ministry of the Interior
(Ministère de l’intérieur).
After being received by the OFPRA, an asylum application is assigned to a caseworker
(officier de protection) who, in most cases, subsequently interviews the applicant. Asylum
interviews can vary considerably in length, but usually last between an hour and an hour
and a half. They tend to be divided into two parts: in the first, the caseworker seeks to
establish the applicant’s identity and to collect other basic personal information; in the
second, the focus is on the applicant’s narrative and reasons for applying for asylum. With
non-francophone applicants, either an interpreter is provided by the OFPRA or the
caseworker conducts the interview directly in a language other than French. After the
interview, the caseworker forwards a proposal to accept or reject the application to the head
of their section (or division), the person responsible for signing the final decision. The
applicant is then sent a letter informing them of the outcome of their application.
Appeals against the OFPRA’s decisions can be made to an administrative court: the
National Asylum Court [Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA), known until 1 January
2008 as the Commission des recours des réfugiés (CRR)/Refugee Appeals Board].
Appellants are entitled to be assisted by a barrister (conseil) and an interpreter when their
case comes before the CNDA. In advance of the actual hearing, a CNDA official (known
as a rapporteur) writes a report that concludes with an opinion (avis) as to whether the
appeal should be accepted or rejected, based on the current state of the case file.
At the CNDA, most appeals are heard by panels of three judges. In any one morning
or afternoon session, a panel of judges may hear up to 13 different appeals. How long the
examination of an individual case lasts varies, depending on its complexity and a number
of other factors. However, the Cimade (Comité inter-mouvements auprès des evacuées), a
French association that provides legal advice and other support to asylum seekers and
refugees, observed 203 cases at the CNDA over a three-month period in 2009 and found
that the average time taken to hear an individual appeal – including the report, which the
rapporteur reads out at the start, and the barrister’s statement – was 33 minutes (Cimade,
2010, p. 47). After the hearing, the three judges discuss all the appeals that have just
come before them, deciding in each case whether to annul OFPRA’s original decision
(and therefore grant refugee status or subsidiary protection) or to reject the appellant’s
appeal against this decision. A letter is subsequently sent to the appellant, informing them
of the outcome of their appeal.
Interpreting services, codes of conduct and institutional expectations
A distinction is usually drawn between ‘interpretation’, i.e. ‘the oral transfer of meaning
between languages’, and ‘translation’, the ‘process of transferring meaning from a written
text in one language to a written text in another’ (Colin & Morris, 1996, p. 16). As
indicated in the previous section, refugee status determination procedures in the UK and
France usually require both the translation of written documents and the interpretation of
4 R. Gibb and A. Good
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oral exchanges in asylum interviews and appeals hearings. However, only the second of
these forms of intercultural communication will be examined in the rest of this article. It
is important to note before doing so that legal professionals in both countries also refer to
‘interpretation’, in the context of their own activities, as the process of determining the
‘true meaning’ of a legal text or document (Colin & Morris, 1996, p. 16; Cornu, 2007,
p. 510). As Colin and Morris (1996, p. 17) explain, in their study of interpreters in the
legal process in England and Wales, this frequently leads lawyers to insist in court that
interpreters ‘translate’ rather than ‘interpret’ a speaker’s utterances, by which they mean
provide a literal or verbatim ‘translation’ (as opposed to an ‘interpretation’, in the legal
sense). Colin and Morris (1996, p. 17) point out, however, that ‘word-for-word or literal
translation often produces distorted communication’, due partly to the fact that words
depend for their meaning on how they are combined with other words within a given
utterance; an understanding of this context is required for accurate translation and
interpretation to be possible. Against this background, the remainder of the present
section will describe and compare the provision of interpreting services and the
expectations surrounding the interpreter’s work (as reflected in codes of conduct) in the
different administrative and legal settings associated with the UK and French asylum
processes.
In England and Wales, following a 1993 recommendation by the Runciman Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice, the National Register for Public Service Interpreters
(NRPSI) was set up, together with a qualifying diploma examination in Public Service
Interpreting. From 1997 onwards, a National Agreement required every interpreter
working in courts to be registered with one of four professional bodies, all of which had
codes of professional conduct8: similar arrangements governed UKBA procedures.
However, a January 2010 audit found that booking and payment arrangements were
inefficient, quality assurance systems were inadequate, and some courts used outdated
NRPSI lists or unregistered interpreters. The costs of the system were not clear. In August
2011 the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) therefore signed a four-year contract with a private
company, Applied Language Solutions (ALS), following a competitive tendering process,
and ALS began supplying interpreters to courts and tribunals from 30 January 2012. The
initial months of this contract were dogged by complaints and controversy, however.
Many experienced interpreters refused to work under the greatly reduced pay scales
offered by ALS, and the MoJ itself admitted to an ‘unacceptable’ number of problems,
such as failures to provide interpreters or provision of incompetent interpreters, leading to
repeated adjournments (House of Commons Justice Committee [HCJC], 2013, pp. 5–11,
41n). By the end of February 2012, the MoJ was forced to allow courts to revert to the
old system as an interim measure to avoid further interpreter-related delays. In October
2012, ALS was taken over and rebranded as Capita Translation and Interpreting, but
complaints about pay rates and about the reduction or removal of travelling expenses
have continued.
While the use of interpreters in French refugee status determination procedures is not a
new phenomenon, a specific ‘interpreting service’ (service d’interprétariat) was only
created at the CRR/CNDA in 1994 and at the OFPRA in 2001. In both cases, this was
largely a response to an increase in the number of asylum applications and appeals received
and of the languages spoken by asylum applicants. Since 2003, the provision of interpreters
has been organised through a system of ‘competitive tendering’ (marchés publics),
covering both the OFPRA and the CRR/CNDA. While 46% of asylum interviews at the
OFPRA were conducted in the presence of an interpreter in 2003, this had risen to 82%
in 2011 (OFPRA, 2011, p. 106, 2012, p. 63). Not surprisingly, the cost of providing
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interpreting services at the OFPRA has also increased, from 1.1M€ in 2005 to 2.4M€ in
2011 (OFPRA, 2007, p. 38, 2012, p. 59). At the CNDA, 95% of appellants are not French
speakers (CRR, 2007, p. 19), and the cost of interpreting services was 1.1M€ in 2008
although this is likely to have risen since then, as has been the case at the OFPRA (2009, pp.
44, 50). In 2011, the OFPRA received 40,464 first applications, an increase of 9.6%
compared to the previous year, while 31,983 appeals were lodged at the CNDA, a rise of
16.5% in one year (Conseil d’État, 2012, p. 33; OFPRA, 2012, p. 74).
Both UKBA’s Central Interpreters Unit and the Tribunals Service have codes of
conduct for the interpreters they use. While mostly concerned with general professional
behaviour, the UKBA code does include a section on ‘Accurate and Precise Interpreta-
tion’. Typically, this begins by stressing that interpreters must ‘retain every single
element of information that was contained in the original message, and interpret in as
close verbatim form as English style, syntax and grammar will allow’ (italics added).9
Similarly, the Tribunals Service’s Handbook for Freelance Interpreters (2011) instructs
interpreters to ‘use the witness’s exact words. If you cannot make a direct or exact
interpretation, interpret it as accurately as possible in the witness’s own words and then
inform the Judiciary what the phrase means’; later, it re-emphasises ‘Please do not … use
an English expression or phrase which is not an exact translation of the witness’s own
words’ (Henderson & Pickup, 2012, para. 34.24). What constitutes an ‘exact translation’
is left unclear.
In France, there is a code of conduct for interpreters at the CNDA but not at the
OFPRA. The CNDA code (a copy of which is displayed on the wall of the interpreters’
room at the Court) sets out the five ‘duties’ (devoirs) of interpreters working there:
punctuality and diligence, impartiality and independence, neutrality, accuracy (la justesse
de l’interprétation) and confidentiality (le secret professionnel). Although an equivalent
document does not exist at the OFPRA, a number of ‘basic rules’ (règles élémentaires)
for interpreters, such as neutrality, are written into the specification or tender documents
(cahier des charges) used in the competitive tendering procedure through which the
provision of interpreting services there (and at the CNDA) is organised (interview with
Head of the Interpreting Service, OFPRA). Although a single system of competitive
tendering covers interpreting services at the OFPRA and the CNDA, and the same
interpreter may therefore be contracted to work at both institutions, what is expected of
the interpreter in practice is not the same in the two settings. Semi-structured interviews
conducted in 2008 and 2009 with the Head of the Interpreting Service at the OFPRA, her
counterpart at the CNDA, interpreters working at the OFPRA and/or CNDA, OFPRA
caseworkers and CNDA rapporteurs, as well as observation of asylum interviews and
appeal hearings, highlighted a number of important differences.10 One of these relates
back to the distinction between ‘translation’ and ‘interpretation’ introduced at the
beginning of this section. Thus, the Head of the Interpreting Service at the OFPRA
commented in the following way on the interpreter’s role at the administrative institution:
The interpreter – what I always say to interpreters – for me, interpreters here [i.e., at the
OFPRA] – and it is not pejorative, on the contrary – are instruments of communication. And
that is no small matter. (…) I explain to interpreters that their role is to translate11 (traduire),
and I’m using this term translate (traduire) deliberately. Because you know that in French
interpret (interpréter) can be something else. (…) So, the interpreters should translate. It’s an
essential role and it’s not as simple as it might appear.
Thus, the expectation at the OFPRA – and this was confirmed by interpreters interviewed
for the research, as will be shown below – is that interpreters will ‘translate’ rather than
6 R. Gibb and A. Good
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 04
:16
 19
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
‘interpret’ the speaker’s words, in the sense of providing a word-for-word or verbatim
translation. Although the OFPRA is an administrative institution and not a court, the
perspective on the interpreter’s role here appears similar to the one held by many lawyers
in English and Welsh courts, as discussed above.
In contrast, what is expected of the interpreter at the CNDA, an administrative court,
is not a literal or verbatim translation but instead the transmission of an equivalent
message or meaning from one language to another. The following comment from the
Head of the Interpreting Service at the CNDA makes this clear:
I am not sure that I ask them [i.e. interpreters] to do the same job (le même métier). At the
Office [OFPRA], they want word-for-word, a word-for-word translation. What I ask them to
do is to transcribe the meaning (sens) of what is said. (…) That is a fundamental difference.
A 25-page document entitled ‘Interpreting at the Refugee Appeals Board: Code of Conduct
and Organisation’ (CRR, 2007), written by the Head of the Interpreting Service at the
CNDA and distributed to all interpreters working at the Court, appears to make a similar
distinction when it states that: ‘The role of the translator12 is not to transcode (n’est pas de
faire du transcodage) but rather to render the meaning (sens) contained in the appellant’s
discourse and in the questions asked by the panel of judges’ (p. 14). This sentence is
immediately followed by a paragraph in which it is emphasised that interpreters should not
‘limit themselves to a mechanical translation (une traduction machinale) of the questions
and answers’ uttered by the various participants in the hearing, but must also attempt to
reflect the ‘nuances’ contained in the questions asked by the judges when interpreting these
for the appellant (p. 14).
Interpreters with experience of working at both the OFPRA and the CNDA confirmed
that expectations with regard to their role were not the same at the two institutions. As
one interpreter stated:
In fact, there is a huge difference. At the OFPRA, what we are asked for is more a
translation, in the literal sense of the term, that is to say an almost literal translation of the
asylum seekers’ words. What we are asked for here [at the OFPRA] is really a translation of
the words, practically an oral translation. They call it here – I like the expression very much –
brut de décoffrage. Décoffrage is when you make cement, and as soon as you remove [the
framework or coffrage], you see exactly what is there. That is to say, they want to have the
unprocessed material (la matière brute). That’s the first big difference. At the CNDA, it is
more the case that we do oral interpretation.13
In other words, the interpreter at the OFPRA is generally called upon to provide a word-for-
word or verbatim translation of the asylum applicant’s words that leaves them in a ‘raw’ or
‘untreated’ state, available for subsequent ‘interpretation’ by the caseworker. The situation
is different at the CNDA, where accurate and precise interpretation is not equated with a
literal translation of words from one language to another. There is thus a striking contrast
between the two French institutions in this respect, whereas the expectations of their British
counterparts appear broadly similar to each other.
From the users’ perspective, it is worth noting, finally, that the MoJ in the UK has
general guidance for criminal court staff on working with interpreters, but the Civil
Procedure Rules say nothing whatever about this.14 Similarly, the Tribunal’s Practice
Directions and Practice Notes (www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/practice; accessed 6 March
2013) do not discuss interpreters or how to work with them, even though judges are
expected to assess their performance after every hearing.15 However, its Guidance Notes
Language and Intercultural Communication 7
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do provide a script for IJs to follow when explaining the interpreter’s role to the appellant
and establishing that the appellant and the interpreter understand one another. Rather
oddly, the (very basic) checking of mutual comprehension is left right to the end of this
script, after the judge has explained the structure of the hearing and the role of the
interpreter, all of which have to be translated even though it has yet to be confirmed that
the appellant understands it.16 Another guideline states that if applicants are unrepres-
ented in court, which is increasingly common following cuts to legal aid, requirements of
fairness may entail the interpreter reading out the asylum interview transcript, RFRL, and
other case documentation to them, possibly in full, while ‘Summaries of the objective
evidence may be prepared in advance to be translated to the appellant in Court’.17 The
guidance does not say whose responsibility it is to prepare such summaries. Guidance for
lawyers on working with court interpreters in asylum hearings is given in the Immigration
Law Practitioners Association’s Best Practice Guide (Henderson & Pickup, 2012, chap.
34). Unlike the other UK documents mentioned, this discussion does reveal an awareness
of the limitations of even the most competent interpretation, especially when, as is
invariably the case, different interpreters have been used at each stage of the refugee
status determination process (Henderson & Pickup, 2012, paras. 34.4–34.8).
Fragmented narratives, interpreting dilemmas and barriers to communication
At all the different stages described in the previous sections the interposition of interpreters
creates barriers to communication, irrespective of their competence. For example, in the
UK each of the various codes and guidance stresses the need for asylum applicants to
answer questions in short phrases or sentences, so that these can be fully translated. While
it is of course important that everything an applicant says is communicated to their
interlocutor, this fragmentation of the narrative introduces limitations of its own, as
interpreters themselves are fully aware; they also know that questioners turn these
limitations to their own advantage. As one interpreter commented:
People are discouraged from talking, and the interpreter is always made the excuse for that;
you know, that you need to give short answers so that the interpreter can translate? That is
another constraint brought on by the interpretation process itself … and it works in the
favour of the Home Office because people do not speak like that naturally, and they will lose
track; they will say less than they mean to say simply because they have to break it down.
I’ve seen it on their faces; they just give up, you know? They try to do it for a bit and then
they give up. And let’s not forget, the interpreter has practice at doing this, so do the
Presenting Officers, so do the judges, so do the lawyers, but the asylum applicant doesn’t.
He’s the only one who comes to this all fresh and raw and natural, and the flow of speech,
when it’s constrained like that, very often dries up.
While this applies to the entire asylum process, its different stages do vary in practice in
terms of the restrictions that interpreters themselves are under. When comparing screening
and substantive interviews, one interpreter with more than a decade of experience in Home
Office work stated:
With the substantive interview … the interpreter isn’t supposed to intervene all that much,
whereas in a screening interview it’s okay to intervene because it’s just collecting the data.
It’s less formal. I think the interviewing officers are taking the substantive interview more
seriously in the sense that there’s more important stuff to talk about. They know the
screening interview is just provisional, and they often stop people from talking, ‘No, not
now, not now, you’re going to tell me later, you’re going to tell me later’. So that is done in
quite a hurry.
8 R. Gibb and A. Good
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Whereas those assignments both involve almost entirely the consecutive interpretation of
questions and answers, at hearings themselves the interpreter is also supposed to provide
the appellant with whispered simultaneous interpretation of dialogue involving other
participants. Often this does not happen, however, not least because it is extremely
demanding for interpreters to have to work continuously for such long periods, especially
when required to switch to and fro between consecutive and simultaneous modes. Even
when they do attempt this judges sometimes ask them to stop, as they find it distracting.
The various UK codes and guidelines also specify that interpreters should, as the
Tribunal’s Handbook puts it, ‘endeavour to reflect the type of language that is being used,
whether it is simple, formal, colloquial etc.’ (Henderson & Pickup, 2012, para. 34.24).
This may place the interpreter in a quandary when appellants speak ungrammatically,
rudely or colloquially18:
That’s a dilemma. I find myself actually (laughs) brushing up [their] speech because I
certainly don’t want to come across as a bad interpreter and it can be believed that it is me
who is making the grammatical errors.19 And also, for me, it is difficult to interpret in a
different register to the one I usually speak in. I realised that for a long time I did that, when
interpreting for [one particular minority group] at the Home Office. I would use polysyllabic
words … and then I thought, hang on, these people are going to go to appeal and the way
they speak is going to come across so, so disjointed from how they came across in the
asylum interview. What’s that going to do to their credibility?
In addition to having possible implications for perceptions of the credibility of an
appellant’s narrative, differences in the register of speech employed by participants in the
hearings constitute potential barriers to communication and pose further challenges for
interpreters. The need for interpreters sometimes to adapt the wording of questions in
order to ensure effective communication is explicitly acknowledged in the code of
conduct for interpreters at the CNDA in France. Under the heading ‘The Accuracy of
Interpretation’, it is stated that:
[The Interpreter] must behave in a useful and positive manner: to the extent that is strictly
necessary for the expression of justice, the interpreter is authorized to adapt their language
and to reformulate the questions when the appellant has a level of language that is less
sophisticated (moins élaboré) or in the case of incomprehension.
The following extract from an interview with an interpreter who had experience of
working at both the OFPRA and the CNDA provides some examples of this kind of
adaptation:
Interpretation at the Court is more difficult, technically speaking. Why? Because you must
remain faithful to the translation, to the appellant’s words, but at the same time you must
make a dialogue possible. Now, on the one hand I have judges who have a string of
qualifications (qui ont fait bac plus 36) and on the other peasants, fishermen, farmers, people
who don’t know anything about the system in their country and even less about the system in
France. So, for example, if I’m asked to translate ‘Were you arrested and kept in police
custody (arrêté en garde à vue)? Were you brought before an examining magistrate (déféré
devant un juge d’instruction)?’ I can translate that to the person, absolutely, but they won’t
understand a thing. Do you see? Therefore, while remaining faithful to what was meant and
to the words, I have to adapt my language in such a way that it is understood, because if the
legal dialogue (le dialogue judiciaire) is not possible, I’m not being of use. (…) [At the
OFPRA] they don’t want this adaptation; they want the raw material (ils veulent du brut).
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This highlights the fact that while there is often an institutional requirement or expectation
that the interpreters will be ‘invisible’,20 the latter’s role in practice is often that of ‘an active
verbal participant’ (Berk-Seligson, 2002, p. 64) in the interactions that take place in UK and
French asylum interviews and appeal hearings.
The issue of the interpreter’s role can be explored further by returning to the UK
guidelines and codes of conduct discussed earlier. These stress that the interpreter’s task is
to provide verbatim or ‘exact’ translation and that they must not, as the UKBA code of
conduct puts it:
ask the interviewee what they mean by a particular answer … try to anticipate what the
interviewer or interviewee is trying to say or give an answer other than what is being said
(or) let your own experience or views get in the way of how you interpret the evidence.
The assumption here, very clearly, is that the interpreter’s own understanding of what
the interviewee means to say is to be suppressed because it will ‘get in the way’ of the
desired verbatim translation.
Such naivety about the translation process is of course not confined to legal contexts.
However, its stress here seems partly also to reflect the centrality of language to the entire
legal process. As Wadensjö argues, building upon Morris’s work cited earlier (and also
Morris, 1995):
established legal systems show little or no readiness to acknowledge the interpreter-mediated
situation as essentially different from the ordinary, monolingual one, and the court interpreter’s
task as truly interpretive. Instead, the court interpreter is defined as a disembodied mechanical
device. (Wadensjö, 1998, p. 74)
This, she argues, is partly because law itself, as performed in court, depends so heavily on
the skilful manipulation of language by lawyers and its incompetent or untrained use by
those under cross-examination (which will almost certainly be portrayed in asylum
contexts as damaging their credibility). As Atkinson and Drew (1979) pointed out in their
seminal study of courtroom dialogue, cross-examination seeks to ‘to challenge or blame
the witness’ by getting them to agree to the ‘facts’ progressively brought out during the
questioning (pp. 105, 106). Both questions and answers are moulded by expectations over
what the interlocutor will say next. For example, barristers expect that their accusations
will produce denials, and try to turn that expectation to advantage by choosing forms of
words such that witnesses damage their standing or credibility whatever answers they
give (‘when did you last beat your wife?’). Witnesses themselves may respond by
‘hedging’ to mitigate any potential admission; instead of a simple ‘yes’, they reply ‘I
suppose so’. These processes become far more difficult for lawyers when they are forced
to work through interpreters, and legal efforts to limit and ‘mechanise’ the interpreter’s
role can be seen as attempts to maintain as far as possible the hegemony of the examining
lawyer. Thus, as Wadensjö (1998) notes:
it would obviously be a challenge to the court if interpreters were … allowed to clarify an
attorney’s deliberately ambiguous question. It would be a threat to the system if interpreters
were allowed to improve the image of witnesses … by rendering eloquently and precisely
statements which were originally voiced carelessly and imprecisely. (p. 75)
On the other hand, the UK Tribunal’s Handbook for Freelance Interpreters also provides
potentially contradictory guidance:
10 R. Gibb and A. Good
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You may intervene at the hearing for the following reasons: to seek clarification if you have
not fully understood what [has] been asked to interpret; to alert the Judiciary that although
the interpretation was correct, the question or statement may not have been understood; to
alert the court to a possible missed cultural inference – such as when an item of information
has not been stated but knowledge of which has been assumed. (in Henderson & Pickup,
2012, para. 34.24; their gloss)
Clearly then, interpreters constantly have to use their judgement over whether to
‘intervene’ and explain that a misunderstanding or missed inference may have occurred.
Not surprisingly, they differ greatly in the extent to which they do this in practice. Their
behaviour is likely to reflect not only their own personal shyness or ebullience but also
the professional stress upon self-effacement. They also know very well that if they
intervene in this way too often, this is likely to be attributed to their incompetence rather
than their alertness and sensitivity.
Missed social and cultural inferences are rendered more likely by what Rycroft labels
the ‘silent actors’ in asylum hearings, namely, the legal elements of refugee law that
motivate particular questions but of which the appellant is usually unaware. For example,
a person is only recognised as a genuine refugee if they have first exhausted all avenues
of domestic protection, so they are almost always asked about relocating within their own
country:
Thus the ubiquitous question is: ‘Have you tried to move to a different part of Romania?’
Many applicants say, ‘No, because the police are hand in hand.’ The fact that they did not
attempt to relocate will count against them, although, had the applicants known where the
question was aiming, they may have explained that in Romania the police keep centralised
records, and that in order to move away one has to request a residence visa from the police.
(Rycroft, 2005, p. 241)
As an experienced legal interpreter who is herself Romanian, Rycroft is fully aware of
this unspoken contextual background, both the legal reasons for the question and the
relevant information missing from the appellant’s answer. The dilemma for her is whether
to interpose her own explanation. Some judges will accept such behaviour by an
interpreter, at least occasionally, but they are more likely to rebuke her for exceeding her
duties by giving evidence as though she were herself a witness.
Elsewhere, one of us gave a lengthy example involving an exceptionally proactive
Farsi interpreter, showing how his own interpolations frequently helped the court by
clarifying the appellant’s answers, but also sometimes disrupted it, to the extent even of
‘correcting’ lawyers questions and – on one occasion – actually subverting the normal
order of proceedings (Good, 2007, pp. 167–169, 177–178). The excerpts cited there also
illustrated that there are certain matters, such as dates in non-Western calendars, or kin
terms where kinship itself is structured very differently, that are inherently impossible to
translate exactly or verbatim (see also Kalin, 1986). Different interpreters, or the same
interpreter on different occasions, may offer differing but equally valid English (or
French) equivalents, creating, purely as an artefact of interpretation, the impression that
the appellant is confused and possibly untruthful.
Conclusion
Interpreters play a crucial role in facilitating intercultural communication in the context of
asylum interviews and appeal hearings in countries such as the UK and France that are
signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. As this article has highlighted, however, their
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task is a complex one. First, the institutions in which they work sometimes have differing
expectations as to the nature of their activity (e.g. providing a literal/verbatim translation or
transmitting the ‘meaning’ of messages from one language to another), and these shape the
definition of ‘appropriate communication’ in the particular contexts concerned. Second,
institutional codes of conduct or guidance for interpreters can provide potentially
contradictory advice, confronting them with dilemmas and requiring them to exercise their
judgement on a range of matters. The latter include whether or not to intervene to explain a
cultural misunderstanding, how to negotiate different registers of speech without
potentially damaging the perceived credibility of an applicant’s or appellant’s narrative
and how to ‘adapt’ or reformulate questions (and answers) in order to ensure effective
communication between the parties involved. Third, the fragmentation of applicants’ or
appellants’ narratives that results from their having to answer questions in short phrases or
sentences introduces barriers to communication and imposes restrictions on even the most
competent of interpreters (as well as on the other parties involved in the process). Despite
these constraints, interpreters are active participants in the often multilingual and
intercultural exchanges that take place in asylum interviews and appeal hearings, although
the mechanistic views of interpretation and ideas about the ‘invisibility’ of the interpreter
that are sometimes (but not always, as has been emphasised) found in these legal and
administrative contexts can obscure this fact.
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Notes
1. In the ‘Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of The Council on
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection status (Recast)
(1.6.2011)’, Article 13.3(c) has been recast as follows:
[Member States shall] select a competent interpreter who is able to ensure appropriate
communication between the applicant and the person who conducts the interview. The
communication shall take place in the language preferred by the applicant unless there is
another language which he/she understands and in which he/she is able to communicate
clearly. Wherever possible, Member States shall provide an interpreter of the same sex if
the applicant so requests. (Article 15.3(c) of the ‘Amended Proposal’)
2. On this final issue, by contrast, case law in the UK has emphasised that appellants should not
be required to give evidence in a language other than the first or preferred language (Kaygun v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department).
3. For more details on the UK process and the importance of credibility, see Good (2011a, 2011b).
The two kinds of interviews have been nicely described, from an interpreter’s perspective, by
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Rycroft (2005, pp. 227–232). There is also a ‘fast track’ process (not described here) involving
less scrutiny and procedural short cuts.
4. The organisational structure of the immigration courts and the titles given to IJs have changed
several times in recent years, but the format of the actual appeal hearings has not changed.
5. Interpreters at appeal hearings are hired by the Ministry of Justice, as discussed in the following
section.
6. Subsequent appeals to higher tribunals or courts are limited to matters of law, and although the
boundary between law and fact is often hazy in asylum claims, there is mostly no fresh
evidence at these later hearings. Consequently the applicants themselves rarely attend and no
provision is normally made for interpretation.
7. For more detailed accounts of refugee status determination procedures in France, see Cimade
(2010) and Gibb and Good (2013, pp. 295–297).
8. These were NRPSI, the Chartered Institute of Linguists, the Institute of Translation and
Interpreting and the Association of Police and Court Interpreters.
9. The UKBA code appears to date from 2008. See www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/
documents/policyandlaw/asylumprocessguidance/relateddocuments/Theasyluminterview/conduc-
tingtheasylumintervie2.pdf?view=Binary (accessed 6 March 2013).
10. Although it will not be discussed here, one difference is that a ‘swearing in’ ceremony for new
interpreters (assermentation), at which an oath is administered (valid only for the CNDA), is
held annually at the CNDA (an administrative court), whereas no equivalent procedure occurs
at the OFPRA (an administrative institution).
11. Bold is used here, and in subsequent extracts from interviews, to indicate words emphasised by
the speaker. All extracts from interviews conducted in French that are reproduced in this article
have been translated by the first author.
12. The words ‘translator’ and ‘translation’ are sometimes used in this document when it is a
question of the interpretation of oral exchanges rather than the translation of texts.
13. Another interpreter who had worked at both institutions expressed the difference in
expectations as follows: ‘The [OFPRA] case-workers insist on a much more literal translation,
whereas at the Commission [CNDA] we are allowed to reformulate the words in order to make
them, you could almost say, clearer in fact’.
14. For criminal court guidance, see http://rpsi.name/docs/interpreters_good_practice_guide%20sept
10.pdf; for the Civil Procedure Rules, see www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules
(both accessed 7 March 2013).
15. They are asked to assess ‘Overall standard of English; Comprehension; Fluidity; Overall
standard of interpretation; Appropriate body language/tone of voice; Adherence to Tribunal
Service protocol; Professionalism’, but clearly an IJ ‘will have no way of judging the real
standard of interpretation unless he is familiar with the language in which the witness is giving
evidence’ (Henderson & Pickup, 2012, para. 34.21). In France, judges at the CNDAwere asked
to provide a similar assessment of interpreters over the course of a month in 2008.
16. See www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/tribunals/immigration-and-asylum/lower/GuideNoteNo3.pdf
(accessed 6 March 2013).
17. See www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/tribunals/immigration-and-asylum/lower/GuideNoteNo3.pdf
and www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/tribunals/immigration-and-asylum/lower/GuidanceNote.pdf
(accessed 6 March 2013).
18. This of course applies to all participants in the hearing, not just the appellant. This is extremely
demanding; as Rycroft (2005) notes, ‘the interpreter will interpret what is said by four different
parties and must maintain consistency with the tone and demeanour of each one … like an
actor playing several roles’ (pp. 233–234).
19. See Pöllabauer (2004, pp. 163–168) for a discussion of ‘face-saving strategies’ in asylum
interviews.
20. For example, while the document ‘Interpreting at the Refugee Appeals Board: Code of Conduct
and Organisation’ distances itself from a mechanistic view of interpretation, as noted above, it
nevertheless states that: ‘A good interpreter should pass unnoticed (Un bon interprète doit passer
inaperçu)’ (CRR, 2007, p. 14). The problematic nature of ideas about the ‘invisibility’ of the
translator has been extensively discussed in the literature (see, for example, Venuti, 2008).
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